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Introduction and Background 
The rationality of science is based on a central commitment to evidence as the basis of belief 
(Siegel, 1989).  A reasonable expectation might be, therefore, that an education in science 
would develop students’ understanding of the epistemology of science as it will expose them to 
the basis of scientific reasoning and its value.  As a corollary, such an understanding might 
help develop their own personal epistemology – that is the criteria that students use for judging 
the value of knowledge claims.  Kuhn and her co-workers, for instance, argue that, on a 
personal level, students need to acquire a personal epistemology which she characterizes as 
that of an ‘evaluativist’.  Such individuals are able to identify and distinguish theoretical 
claims from the evidence used to support them; recognise claims as potentially falsifiable; 
and see evidence as the means of falsification (Kuhn, Iordanou, Pease, & Wirkala, 2008). 
These are the elements of rational thought and such meta-knowledge is the essential 
foundation of skilled scientific thinking and reasoning. But what is known about students’ 
understanding of the epistemology of science and their own personal epistemologies?  
Research on students’ understanding of the epistemology of science itself (as 
opposed to their personal epistemology) has suggested that students’ knowledge and 
understanding is fairly limited (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996; Sandoval, 2003).  Driver 
et al. concluded that students have difficulty determining the role of theories in science and 
the way that theories are evaluated against existing data by experimentation. In particular, 
scientific theories were viewed as simple descriptions of taken-for-granted facts, especially 
for 9-year olds.  Moreover, for these students, theories were seen to be of lower epistemic 
status than ‘facts’, which were considered to be the ultimate goal of science.  Such a finding 
stands in stark contrast to the view within science that ‘theories are the crown of science, for 
in them our understanding of the world is expressed’ (p. 168) (Harré, 1984).  Views of 
scientific theories as ideas based in evidence, or as a way of modeling phenomena and 
predicting their behavior, were found more often in older students’ responses. Sandoval and 
Morrison (2003) have also explored high school students’ ideas of scientific theories and 
theory change finding: a) that scientific theories were viewed as hypotheses which are 
repeatedly proven; and b) the dominance of a correspondence view of science where 
scientific theories are thought to provide explanations of the world as it is rather than being a 
map of reality which has the potential to be improved. 
Looked somewhat more broadly from a domain-general perspective, Hofer and 
Pintrich (1997) have suggested that there are four dimensions to any individuals’ 
epistemological beliefs.  These are: 
 
  certainty of knowledge (stability) 
  simplicity of knowledge (structure), 
  source of knowing (authority), and  
  justification for knowing (evaluation of knowledge claims).  
 
Certainty of knowledge is something which changes over time beginning at lower 
levels where knowledge is certain and absolute and moving to a view where knowledge is 
seen as tentative and evolving and where individuals are open to new interpretations. 
Simplicity of knowledge is a measure of an individual’s understanding of the structure of 
knowledge and lies on a continuum between an accumulation of facts versus a set of highly 
inter-related concepts.  The lower-level view is to see knowledge as a set of discrete facts 
whilst at the higher level, knowledge becomes relative and contextual and open to   3 
interpretation.  Source of knowing refers to views an individual holds about the source of 
epistemic authority.  At lower levels it originates outside the self and resides in an external 
authority.  The big transformation comes when the individual who was previously ‘a holder 
of meaning becomes a maker of meaning’ (Perry, 1970) (p87) and recognizes that 
transformation. Justification of knowing refers to the views that individuals hold about how 
claims to knowledge can be justified moving from dualistic beliefs where ideas are either 
right or wrong to an understanding that knowledge is something which requires a reasoned 
justification for belief. 
To measure these concepts, an instrument was initially developed by Elder (2002) 
and then improved by Conley et al.  (2004), who showed it to be internally reliable and hold 
a four-dimensional factor structure corresponding to these theoretical scale using 
confirmatory factor analysis. Data gathered from a sample of 187, fifth grade students, 
showed that students became more sophisticated in their beliefs about the source and 
certainty of knowledge in science with instruction, but that there were no reliable changes in 
justification.  
Students’ personal epistemologies, in contrast, are the means or approaches that 
students use for judging and evaluating claims about knowledge that they meet within their 
own lives – what Sandoval terms ‘practical epistemologies’ which he distinguishes from 
‘formal epistemologies’ which are the ideas they hold about scientific reasoning.  The latter, 
he argues, are hopelessly naïve (Sandoval, 2005). When it comes to assessing students’ 
personal (or practical) epistemologies, Kuhn and her co-workers (Kuhn, 1999; Kuhn, 
Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000) have argued for a developmental model of students’ personal 
epistemologies proposing that students begin life as ‘absolutists’ where knowledge consists 
of certain unequivocal facts.  From here, students are thought to progress to becoming 
essentially relativists.  This occurs when they begin to recognize that there is a subjective 
element to knowledge and lack any sense that there are criteria that enable some claims to be 
judged more valid than others.  These individuals she terms ‘multiplists’.  The final stage is 
when students become ‘evaluativists’ and recognize that there is a need to evaluate critically 
the evidence provided to support claims to knowledge. 
The question of interest for this research is to what extent are students’ personal 
epistemologies related to their ‘formal epistemologies’? To date, researchers in science 
education have seen students’ personal epistemologies as only tangentially related to the 
central epistemological questions of science that seek to explain how we know (Kuhn, 
Iordanou, Pease, & Wirkala, 2008).  However, their inter-relatedness is a concern for science 
educators.  Ford (2008), for instance, argues that the predominant emphasis within science 
on the construction of scientific knowledge and understanding is misplaced.  Rather, 
students need an opportunity to engage in the evaluation and critical review of knowledge 
claims.  Such skills he sees as ‘crucial resources to learning novel scientific ideas with 
understanding’ (p.405).  Only through engaging in the interplay between construction and 
critique which is the hallmark of scientific thinking will students: 
 
come to know that scientific knowledge is held accountable by explicit connections 
to nature, to know how to play the roles of constructor and critiquer appropriately, 
and to know that the interaction of these roles in practice yields reliable knowledge. 
(p.405, author’s emphasis) 
 
Moreover, if students’ personal epistemologies are generally more sophisticated than their 
formal understanding of scientific epistemology it would suggest that their education in 
science has done little to capitalize on their epistemic potential.  More worryingly, the   4 
presentation, either implicitly or explicitly within the context of school science of a naïve 
epistemology could be hindering the development of students’ personal epistemology.  
Given that science has done more than anything else to deliver societies from the shackles of 
received wisdom (Collins, 2000), this would represent a profound irony. 
The interrelationship between students’ formal epistemology and their practical 
epistemologies is a focus, at least in part, of the research we are conducting for the funded 
project ‘Talking to Learn, Learning to Talk in Science’.  The primary goal is twofold. First to 
see whether working with schools rather than individuals would help to establish a 
professional learning community where the use of argumentation and a dialogic pedagogy 
would become a more established feature of teachers’ pedagogic practice. Second, we sought 
to see what effect it would have on students’ cognition, their understanding of the nature of 
science and their epistemic beliefs.  To answer the latter question we have drawn on the 
work of Kuhn et al. to assess student’s practical epistemologies, the work of Conley et al. to 
assess students’ epistemological beliefs, and the work of Driver et al. (1996) to assess both.  
Our goal is based on an argument that this data may help to fill this lacuna in the literature 
and to answer the question of what is the relationship, if any, between students’ knowledge 
of the epistemology of science and their personal epistemic beliefs.  The central question of 
interest here being one of whether a better understanding of the epistemology of science is 
associated with a more sophisticated personal epistemology?   
 
Methods and Design 
For this work, 9 schools were recruited from the Greater London area (4 for the 
intervention and 5 to act as controls).  The sample was purposive in that schools were 
selected to represent a range of socio-economic conditions.  From each school, two classes 
of Grade 6 and two classes of Grade 8 students were selected for testing.  Thus the sample 
consists of approximately 480, Grade 6 students and 480, Grade 8 students.  Students’ 
epistemological beliefs – essentially their knowledge of the formal epistemology of science – 
were measured using a survey instrument developed from the items used by Conley et al. 
(2004) whilst their personal epistemic beliefs were measured using a version of the 
instrument developed by Kuhn et al. (1999). The items from Conley et al. use a 5 point 
Likert scale, which has been previously validated, whilst those of Kuhn et al. pose a set of 
alternative judgements about knowledge claims and students have to judge which they 
consider to be ‘true’. The nature of their response to these items and its consistency enables 
a judgement to be made as to whether they are epistemological absolutists, multiplists or 
evaluativists. The data from these instruments were analyzed using SPSS.   
Students’ understanding of the relationship between theories and evidence and the 
relative epistemic status of facts, theories and hypotheses was also measured by conducting 
20 minute interviews with 6 pairs of students in each grade, providing a sample of 48 pairs in 
each year, and using an adapted form of the instruments developed by Driver et al. (1996). 
These interviews provide data both about students’ practical epistemology that they deploy 
when confronted with the need to resolve conflicting evidence and their views about the 
nature of knowledge in science i.e. their formal epistemology. The rationale for using group 
interviews was that the opportunity for students to engage in discursive interaction with each 
other would produce more insights into student thinking and that this would be less 
intimidating – particularly for younger students.  This does mean, however, that the unit of 
analysis becomes the group and not the individual.  Thus in coming to a view about the 
meaning of the discourse, it was always the outcome of any student discussion that was 
coded rather than individual difference. Data from the interviews were analyzed using a 
coding schema which was in part grounded in the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1994) and in part   5 
driven by contemporary theoretical frameworks of what constitutes a sophisticated scientific 
epistemology (Hodson, 2008; Longino, 1990; Pickering, 1995).  For instance, a particular 
interest was in how they saw the interrelationship between facts and theories. Using the 
schema, the interviews were coded and cross-checks conducted for reliability between three 
researchers.  A reliability check between two researchers of one third of the sample attained 
agreement at the 83% level. Interviews were then coded using NVivo 8 to identify the major 
features in student understanding. 
Results  
Data from the Kuhn Instrument was categorised using their responses into a set of 
categories, which were: 
 
Absolutist:  3 Absolutist Responses 
Absolutist/Multiplist:    A mix of absolutist and multiplist responses 
Multiplist  3 Multiplist responses 
Evaluativist-  2 Evaluativist responses and another response, which was either 
absolutist or multiplist 
Evaluativist  3 Evaluativist responses 
Indeterminate  One response of each type 
 
The distribution of responses and their percentages by year group are shown in Fig 1 and Fig 




Fig 1: Chart showing Distribution of Personal Epistemologies from the Kuhn 








Fig 2: Chart showing Distribution of Personal Epistemologies from the Kuhn 










Absolutist    1.9  0.9 
Absolutist+  2 Abs & 1 Multiplist 
1 Abs & 2 Multiplist 
8.9  8.4 
Multiplist    3.7  6.5 
Evaluativist-  2 Evaluativist + 1 
Absolutist/Multiplist 
39.6  36.7 
Evaluativist    39.2  42.1 
Indeterminate    6.8  5.3 
 
Table 1:  Table showing the percentage of students and their epistemological levels. 
 
These responses show that the practical epistemology of most students can be assessed as 
evaluativists or near to that. Granted the assessment is made on a very limited number of 
items, would suggest that the data are an indication of how students reason rather than a 
consistent reliable measure. These data are triangulated, therefore, against other data, which 
we discuss beneath. 
   7 
 
Measures of Epistemological Beliefs about Science 
Students were asked to respond to a set of statements assessing their formal epistemological 
beliefs, which has 4 subscales. Factor analysis has shown these to be unitary and values for 
Cronbach alpha exceed .7 for all scales.  Scales were scored on a 5-point scale from ‘strongly 
agree’ (1) to ‘strongly disagree’ (5).  In the case of the Source and Certainty scales, 
disagreement was indicative of more sophisticated knowledge about epistemic beliefs in 
science.  The reverse was true for the Development and Justification scales so these scores 
were reversed. 
 
  Grade 6    Grade 8    Conley 
Mean 
  Mean  SD  Mean  SD   
Source  3.34  .80  3.62  .72  3.68 
Certainty  3.45  .77  3.69  .65  3.38 
Development  4.15  .44  4.16  .44  3.90 
Justification  4.22  .41  4.10  .46  4.26 
 
Table 2: Mean values for Conley Scales and Standard Deviations 
 
Conley’s results obtained with US 5
th graders using this instrument were higher than the 
values obtained here for Source and Justification but less for Certainty and Development. 
This is somewhat surprising given that our data were obtained from students in Grades 6 
and 8 who were at least one, if not two years older. There was a significant difference 
(p<.01) between Grade 6 and Grade 8 students in the sophistication of their views about 
Source, Certainty and Justification of scientific knowledge. No such difference existed for 
the Development scale.  However, in all cases the differences are not large. The important 
feature is that the mean responses for Source and Certainty have improved between Grade 6 
and Grade 8.  The same is not true for Development, which remained almost the same 
across the two age groups. What is also of interest is that both our younger group of Grade 6 
students and Conley’s 5
th graders do better on the Justification scale than the Grade 8 
students.  
 
An analysis of the correlation between student responses to the Kuhn items (a measure of 
their practical epistemologies) and their mean response for the Conley items using 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation coefficient gives the following data: 
 
  
  Grade 6  Grade 8 
Source  .163**  .252** 
Certainty  .300**  .248** 
Development  .063  .138** 
Justification  -.034  .011 
 
Table 3: Correlations between students’ practical epistemologies and their formal 
epistemologies (** p<0.01) 
 
The main feature to emerge from this analysis is that, whilst significant for both the Source 
and Certainty scales for Grade 6 and Grade 8, and significant for the Development scale for   8 
the Grade 8 group, the correlations in all cases are only small.  In the case of the Justification 
scale the relation is not significant and there is an indication that the two are negatively 
associated for Grade 6.  The lack of a stronger correlation is, at first site, somewhat 
surprising. One possible explanation is that this finding is a consequence of the fact that 
most students are relatively sophisticated in both their personal (practical) epistemologies 
and the ideas that they held about the formal epistemology of science, which would weaken 
the strength of the association between the two measures. Another, which we will discuss 
later, is that these instruments activate different epistemological resources, which are 
relatively unrelated. 
 
Analysis of Student Interviews 
Student Interviews were conducted with a total of 108 pairs of students, 54 from grade 6 and 
54 from grade 8. The interview schedule explored both their knowledge of the formal 
epistemology of science – in particular, their understanding of the role of facts, theories and 
evidence in science and their practical epistemology by asking them to consider two 
instances where there were multiple competing explanatory theories.  In the first of these 
tasks (Task 1) they were asked to decide between two contrary theories for how we see 
(because light enters the eyes or because vision is active) and, in the second (Task 2), 
between three differing explanatory theories for why things float and sink – none of which 
were scientifically correct.  The particular focus of this work was on whether they were able 
to identify whether evidence supported one theory, challenged another or was irrelevant.  In 
particular, whether they recognized the existence of a conflict, and how they then resolved 
the conflict generated by evidence, which challenged the existing theory that they had 
initially supported. Interviews were coded with a schema, which was developed over several 
iterations to capture the main themes in the interview. The final coding schema contained 42 
codes grouped under 11 major categories, which were: 
 
Nature of Climate Change   
Conceptions of Facts   
Conceptions of Theories   
Comparison and Connection of Theories and Facts   
Coordination of Theory and Evidence 
  Theory Choice 
  Justification of Theory Choice 
  Dealing with Conflicting Data 
Sources of Knowledge in Science 
Tentative Nature of Science 
Conceptions of Scientists Work 
 
 
Understanding of Scientific Epistemology 
The interview began with asking students whether they felt ideas about climate change to be 
a fact or to be a theory. 28% of the pairs felt it was a fact and 51% to be a theory while 21% 
thought that it might be both. Predominantly, those who believed it to be a fact referred to 
the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere as the evidence that gave it the status of a fact: 
 
Student:    Because the way the climate is evidence that it is. Because of CO2 
and they have been measuring the air pollution.    9 
84% of the pairs were able to give examples of facts, 81% examples of theories and 70% 
examples of both. The strongest feature to emerge from the interview was that in 96% of the 
pairs, the idea was advanced that facts were the product of theories that had been proved.  
This was very much articulated in terms of notions that things could be seen and had been 
tested: 
 
S1:   You can prove it. 
S2:  Yeah, it is that you it’s been proven that it’s changing, you can’t say 
that a football is not a football, you can’t...it is a fact, isn’t it? It’s 
like... 
S1:  It has been proven, like all the tests have been carried out millions 
and billions of times. 
I:  Why do you say millions and billions? 
S1:  Well, not millions and billions, but you have to make sure that facts 
either accurate... 
S2:  ...or reliable.  
S1:  Or reliable.  
 
Theories in contrast were felt to be tentative ideas, opinions or guesses (89%) – something 
that people believed and were, therefore, open to question: 
 
I:  So what do you mean when you say the word theory. What does 
that mean for you? 
S1:  It’s an idea.  
S2:  A thought someone has had. They don’t know if it’s true. They are 
just guessing.  
------------------ 
S:  But an opinion is like a theory. Scientists start with an opinion or a 
theory  
------------------ 
S1:  A theory is what people think. 
S2:  Yes it’s not solid as a fact. It’s more what people believe.  
Our data show that students overwhelmingly see the status of a fact as representing the 
ultimate achievement of scientific knowledge.  In some senses, there is nothing particular 
new about this finding which has been established by previous work (Driver, Leach, Millar, 
& Scott, 1996; Lederman, 1992).  Nor would we wish to argue that students’ who make this 
point are epistemological absolutists.  The other data that we have gathered would not 
support such an interpretation.  Rather, it would seem to us that students are most likely 
using the notion of ‘proof’ in the sense that the knowledge is beyond question – very much 
in the scientific sense that this is a piece of reliable knowledge that has been consensually 
agreed by the scientific community. Facts then are statements about the world, which have 
been shown to be true, verifiable and beyond question. As Latour and Woolgar (1986) have 
pointed out, such knowledge is very much the foundation of textbooks and very much the 
bread-and-butter of what most science curricula address. In this context, it is positive that at   10 
least 36% of the cohort did acknowledge that theories were more important than facts, while 
33% recognized that they were of equal importance, and 41% saw that they had predictive 
value.   
However, the issue of concern for us is that 89% of students predominantly hold the 
lay conception of a theory as little more than an educated guess, especially when only 13% 
recognized that they had explanatory value. Fig 3 beneath shows that this perception varies 
little between the two grades even though the students’ level of conceptual knowledge, as 
measured by a national examination in grade 5 and grade 8 varies considerably (Fig 4). This 
would suggest that their education in science to date has failed to provide them with a sense 
that the apotheosis of science is the creation of theories that offer a coherent explanatory 
framework for a miscellany of observations – such is the achievement of the Copernican 
heliocentric theory, Darwin’s theory of evolution or Wegner’s theory of plate tectonics. 
 
Fig 3: Data for students’ ideas about the role of theories in science for Grade 6 and Grade 8 
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The lack of any association between these performances would suggest that content 
knowledge and its development is separate from the development of any meta-knowledge 
about the nature of science itself. 
 
Evaluating Theories 
The two tasks we offered the students examined their ability to coordinate theory and 
evidence.  Task 1 gave students two theories to discuss about how we see and has been 
extensively used in previous research.  The first finding of note in this work was that 99% of 
student pairs picked the scientific theory as the one that they thought was correct.  This 
finding challenges the work of Guesne (1978) and Andersson and Karrqvist (1983) which 
suggested that the proportion of children  who believed vision to be the outcome of an 
active, not passive, process was large and that the physicists’ model was rare.  What was of 
note in this study was that in both task 1 and task 2, nearly all students were capable of 
explaining how some of the evidence that they were presented with did or did not support 
their chosen theory.  For instance, in the discussion of whether ‘light travelling in straight 
lines’ for Task 1: 
 
Int:    So  light  travels  in  straight  lines.    How  does  that  relate  to  the 
theory?  Does it agree or disagree? 
S2:  Disagree. ‘Cause it is not saying that... 
S1:  It’s not saying that they don’t travel in straight lines but it is not 
saying that they do.  And I already know that’s true. 
S2:  Yeah. 
Int:  So do you think it agrees or disagrees or does it not matter? 
S1:  It doesn’t agree but it doesn’t disagree. 
S2:  I think it agrees with both of what they say but I don’t think it 
really has that much relation with what they think, because they are 
talking about how they travel. 
 
   12 
And in discussing task 2: 
 
Int:  So what do you think would happen to a toy car? 
S2:  Based on that theory I think it would float. 
S1:  Yeah. 
Int:  Why do you think it would float based on that theory? 
S2:  Because it’s more light, it’s not as heavy as a real car 
 
Indeed, 94% went beyond using the evidence provided in the task using supplementary 
evidence, not supplied within the interview, to justify their choice.  
 
S:  Because with theory one, some things that are heavy can float. Like 
avocado, I watched someone drop an avocado and dropped it and 
like floated and it’s quite a heavy object but it floats. 
Students explored the role of evidence and its relationship to theory extensively in both of 
these tasks.  Coding shows that their discourse was dominated by attempts to explain how 
the evidence did or did not support the theory – a finding which is unremarkable given that 
this was the task that they were asked to address.  However, approximately a quarter to one 
third were attempts to justify their theory choice using their own evidence.  Table 4 beneath 
shows the percentage of coding references obtained in each category by age group: 
 
  Grade 6  Grade 8 
Explain Evidence  39.8%  45.3% 
Use Own Evidence to Explain  31.1%  25.2% 
Unprompted Coordination of Theory and Evidence  4.8%  2.8% 
Inappropriate Use of Evidence  12.4%  13.1% 
Justifications other than Evidence  5.3%  6.3% 
Familiarity with Phenomenon  6.5%  7.2% 
 
Table 4: Percentage of coding references used by students in responding to question asking 
them to coordinate theory and evidence in Grade 6 and Grade 8. 
 
 
Our interpretation of these findings is that they suggest that students, when pressed, see that 
claims to knowledge require justification and, in that sense, can be said to be behaving as 
evaluativists.  Not all of these justifications were evidence-based and some tended to be 
advanced in terms of justifications other than evidence.  
 
S2:  Because it is just like telling you that things that are light float and 
things, it is just basically saying that’s why. And that is it really. It is 
not saying why it happens. And the second one is the same because 
they contain air. So it is giving you more of an idea about why.    13 
Such explanations are justified epistemically in that the explanatory power of a theory is a 
common scientific criterion used by scientists to judge its value.  Scientists commonly use 
intrinsic values which are variously described as: mechanistic, materialistic, masculine, 
reductionist, idealized, objective, impersonal, rational, universal, communal, value-free, 
disinterested, parsimonious, authoritarian, socially sterile, positivistic (Putnam, 2004) to assist 
in making judgements about claims to knowledge.  Students here are simply attempting to do 
something similar.  Explicit reflection on such reasoning might help them to become more 
aware of some of the manner in which judgements can be arrived at in science.  
Another common form of reasoning was that which drew on a familiarity with the 
phenomenon.  Commonly the claim to knowledge was made because it was either something 
that they had been taught or that they had read. 
 
Int:   What do you think? Why did you immediately say theory two is 
right? 
S1:  Because that is what I know. 
Int:  How do you know that? 
S2:  We have done it in science. 
S1:  That is what we’ve been taught. 
------------------ 
S2:  We just know it, it's a fact like you have read it in books and stuff. 
You just know it.  
Again, such claims should be seen as normative warrant which of the type commonly used 
by many adults and teachers.  Such reasoning is simply one of the epistemic resources 
deployed in argumentation and should not be seen as indication of a dogmatic belief in 
authority or reflecting an absolutist epistemology. 
There was less explicit indication in the interviews that students saw science itself as 
being a process, which required an evaluative approach. 19% of students mentioned 
spontaneously that science was tentative making statements such as: 
 
S2:  Because in science there is not just one answer, there is a lot of 
answers. 
Int:  To the same thing? 
S2:  Yes. 
----------------------- 
S1:  Sometimes facts can be proven wrong though. 
Int:  Why do you think that? 
S2:  Like when you say the earth is round. People used to think the 
earth was flat until they got proven wrong. 
Int:  So you can have some facts and we think that they are true and 
then… 
S2:  Yes, because if you have like the right equipment to like prove it 
wasn’t right. 
Int:  So we change the facts?   14 
R2:  Yes. 
The conclusion we draw from our analysis is that students’ practical epistemologies, when 
confronted with the need to co-ordinate theory and evidence show some degree of 
sophistication. 72% of students recognised the conflict and Table 5 beneath shows the 
standard ways in which they were found to respond. 
 
Mode of Response  Percentage using this response 
Accommodates Evidence  33.3% 
Changes Theory  34.6% 
Qualifies/Accommodates Theory  35.9% 
Maintains Theory  14.1% 
Reject all-Creates new Theory  15.4% 
  
Table 5:  Mode of Response to Conflict (total more than a 100% as some students used more 
than one way of resolving the conflict) 
 




One third of students did change their theory in the light of conflicting evidence.  Again, the 
failure to change theory or to develop a new theory in the light of cognitive conflict should 
not be seen as an epistemological weakness. The work of Chinn and Brewer (1993) and 
Leitão (2000) has shown that it is rare for this to be the immediate response to conceptual 
conflict.  What is perhaps more notable is that there was only a small number of students 
who realized that none of the theories was adequate and that this number did not vary 
substantially between the two grades. 
 
Conclusions, Implications and Contribution to the Field 
Any conclusions to be drawn from this data set are tentative given its limited nature.  We 
recognize that there are considerable weaknesses in attempting to identify either students’ 
epistemological beliefs or their practical epistemologies from a short survey instrument and 
even the short qualitative interviews we have attempted to conduct (Lederman, Abd-el-  15 
Khalick, Bell, & Schwartz, 2002).  Nevertheless, what this study does offer uniquely is three 
data sets that give different windows into students’ reasoning and their epistemic beliefs 
about science.  Of interest to us are two questions:  first what does this data set say about 
students’ practical epistemologies, their understanding of scientific epistemology and their 
similarities and disparities; second, how do these findings compare with the work of others 
and add to our overall picture of work in this field. 
The data we have obtained from the instruments of Kuhn and from the interviews 
would suggest that students’ practical epistemologies could be characterised as evaluativist or 
at least inclining towards such practices. Such an outcome is congruent with the findings of 
Smith et al. (2000) which found that students taught using a constructivist perspective 
developed an epistemological stance toward science that focused on ‘the central role of ideas 
in the knowledge acquisition process and on the kinds of mental, social, and experimental 
work involved in understanding, developing, testing, and revising these ideas’.  Whilst our 
data consists of only two sets it is at least indicative of some underlying coherence to their 
practical epistemologies.  In one sense this data does not support Hammer and Elby’s (2002) 
view that personal epistemologies as a loose collection of resources which are invoked by 
different contexts – in essence a collection of epistemological primitives which are 
comparatively unrelated.  However, the items posed to these students were specifically 
asking them to take a stance towards certain specific knowledge claims.  These would be 
most likely to trigger Hammer & Elby’s epistemological primitive of ‘doubting’ or ‘accepting’ 
and hence, the coherence in these two contexts which do not call upon the other primitives.  
Evidence that the students do use such evaluative reasoning also comes from the interviews 
where over two thirds of the students at both grade levels either attempted to provide an 
evaluative judgement of how the evidence did or did not support a theory, or alternatively, 
used their own evidence to justify their theory choice. 
When it comes to students’ understanding of the formal epistemology of science, the 
interview would suggest that they hold less developed views of scientific epistemology where 
the primary goal of science is seen as the creation of certain and unequivocal factual 
knowledge. Few seem to recognize that it is the theoretical accounts of the material world 
and their explanatory power, which is the ultimate goal and that facts are simply the 
handmaiden to this goal rather than the end in itself. This picture is, however, contradicted 
by the data from the Conley instrument, which would suggest that students lean, on average, 
towards a more sophisticated view. 
One possible explanation is that students’ responses to the survey could be said to be 
drawing on Hammer and Elby’s notion of ‘knowledge as fabricated stuff’ where knowledge 
is seen as something that is constructed and hence tentative and associated with an element 
of uncertainty which would explain why they appear to be relatively sophisticated. In 
contrast, the questions in the interview, coupled with their experience of school science, 
activate the epistemological primitive of ‘knowledge as propagated stuff’ – an understanding 
that sees knowledge as preformed and only valid if it has been shown to be ‘true’ and has 
acquired the status of a law or a ‘fact’ (Lederman, Abd-el-Khalick, Bell, & Schwartz, 2002; 
McComas, 1996).  Hence the tendency to ascribe a higher epistemic status to ‘facts’. 
This leads us to the view that the way in which knowledge is framed within school 
science draws too much on the notion of ‘knowledge as propagated stuff’. Rather, there 
needs to be more focus on the notion of ‘knowledge as fabricated stuff’.  This does not 
simply mean engaging in more experimentation.  In our findings, 49% of students’ 
commented spontaneously on sources of knowledge in science and their responses were 
dominated by the notion that experiments are critical tests of scientific ideas – essentially the 
epistemic criterion that must be satisfied to establish something as a ‘fact’.  Rather, we would   16 
wish to suggest, along with Ford, that activating the epistemological resource of ‘knowledge 
as fabricated stuff’ requires students to have the opportunity to engage in critical evaluation 
of ideas and data.  It is only this practice that will enable students to see that science is not 
simply a monolithic body of pre-formed knowledge but that rather scientific ideas are 
developed by a process of transformative criticism.  Indeed that the fabrication of new ways 
of conceiving of the world is a more fundamental, and more important aspect of science 
than propagation. 
Such an approach would also have value for student learning as a clear relationship 
between epistemic beliefs and conceptual change has been shown to exist (Andre & 
Windschitl, 2003; Qian & Alverman, 2000).  Students who view knowledge as flexible, 
changing and fabricated are ultimately more likely to change their conceptions about 
scientific phenomena. Moreover, students who see knowledge as something which has to be 
socially and personally constructed are more likely to accept scientific explanations of 
phenomenon (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003).  Hopefully, this paper 
has contributed better to understanding the interrelationship that might exist between 
students’ formal understanding of scientific epistemology and their own practical 
epistemologies.  What it demonstrates is that there is some inter-relationship between the 
two and, just as it is impossible to imagine constructing a house without a roof, likewise, it is 
impossible to imagine helping students to understand the importance of theories, evidence 
and their inter-relationship unless students are provided with more opportunity to see how 
ideas in science are both constructed and evaluated. 
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